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Abstract
While there has been encouraging progress over the last fifteen years in terms of increased 
school enrolment rates, there are continuing concerns about education in India, especially in terms of 
quality.   Debates continue about the role and efficacy of reforms such as educational decentralisation, 
use of contract teachers (para-teachers), curriculum reform, the provision of mid-day meals and the 
use of ‘second-track’ approaches such as the Education Guarantee Scheme schools. However, the role 
of key actors, the teachers and their unions, has received scant attention in these discussions. Using the 
state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) as an example, this paper assembles evidence to suggest that teachers and 
their unions are critical to understanding some of the failings of Indian public education.  The paper 
argues  that  the  lack  of  teacher  accountability  is  rooted  in  teacher  demands  for  a  centralised 
management structure in education.  The data sources for this study are government documents and 
statistics, including UP secretariat publications, academic publications, interviews with teacher union 
leaders  and  education  officials,  newspaper  reports,  the  Report  of  the  National  Commission  on 
Teachers,  Central  Advisory  Board  of  Education,  documents  and  the  published  debates  of  the 
Constituent Assembly.
Acknowledgement:  This paper forms part of the Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and 
Poverty (RECOUP), funded by DFID, 2005-10.  Views expressed here are those of the authors and are 
not  necessarily shared by DFID or  any of  the  partner  institutions.   For  details  of  the  objectives, 
composition and work of the consortium see: http://recoup.educ.cam.ac.uk.
1 This is an updated and shortened version of a paper published by the authors in the Economic and Political 
Weekly, 36(32), in August 2001. 
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Introduction
While there has been encouraging progress over the last fifteen years in terms of increased 
school enrolment rates, there are continuing concerns about education in India, especially in terms of 
quality.   Debates continue about the role and efficacy of reforms such as educational decentralisation, 
use of contract teachers (para-teachers), curriculum reform, the provision of mid-day meals and the 
use of ‘second-track’ approaches such as the Education Guarantee Scheme schools. However, the role 
of key actors, the teachers and their unions, has received scant attention in these discussions. Yet it is 
important to ask whether there is a conflict of interest that causes teacher unions to oppose educational 
reforms  and  to  assess  the  implications  of  teachers’  political  and  union-based  activities  for  the 
functioning of the education sector as a whole.
Using the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) as an example, this paper assembles evidence to suggest 
that  teachers  and their  unions  are  critical  to  understanding  some  of  the  failings  of  Indian public 
education.  According  to  Drèze  and  Gazdar  (1997,  p76-77),  “the  most  striking  weakness  of  the 
schooling system in rural Uttar Pradesh is not so much the deficiency of physical infrastructure as the 
poor functioning of the existing facilities.  The specific problem of endemic teacher absenteeism and 
shirking, which emerged again and again in the course of our investigation, plays a central part in that 
failure.  This is by far the most important issue of education policy in Uttar Pradesh today”.
The PROBE Report (1999) recognised this and linked teacher absenteeism and shirking partly 
to the disempowering environment in which the teachers have to work. However, it also says, “yet, the 
deterioration of teaching standards has gone much too far to be explained by the disempowerment 
factor alone... Generally speaking, teaching activity has been reduced to a minimum in terms of both 
time  and effort.   And this  pattern is not  confined to a minority of  irresponsible teachers – it  has 
become a way of life in the profession” (PROBE,, 1999, p 63). It linked low teacher effort to a lack of 
local-level  accountability.   This,  in turn,  has its  roots in teachers’ own demands  for a centralised 
education system, as discussed later in this paper.
Other authors too have noted lax teacher attitudes and lack of teacher accountability.  Myron 
Weiner in his book The Child and the State in India (Weiner, 1990) reports interviews with a number 
of stakeholders in education who express concerns, including the following:
• “The teachers aren’t any good.  Often they don’t even appear at the school…”,  p. 57 (senior 
education official)
• “the teachers do not care… It is not because teachers are badly paid… Education is well paid 
now and the teachers are organised but they do not teach.  If we don’t respect them it is 
because we see them doing other business than teaching”,  p. 59 (Ela Bhatt, an Ahmedabad 
social activist)
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• “the teachers in the government schools are indifferent.  They have their union and they do not 
think about academics.  Once teachers enter the school system, they cannot be terminated.  No 
one is ever terminated.  The crux of the problem in education is the lack of interest by the 
teachers in the children.  They don’t care about results and … we cannot compel the teacher to 
teach!”, p. 66 (The Secretary of Primary Education in Gujarat, Mr. Gordhanbhai)
• “the problem is with the teachers.  They are not accountable to the students”, p. 70 (Dr. V. 
Kulkarni, physicist-turned-educational researcher and teacher-trainer)
This paper argues that the lack of teacher accountability is rooted in teacher demands for a 
centralised  management  structure  in  education.   The  data  sources  for  this  study  are  government 
documents and statistics, including UP secretariat publications, academic publications, interviews with 
teacher  union  leaders  and  education  officials,  newspaper  reports,  the  Report  of  the  National 
Commission  on  Teachers  (NCT,  1986),  Central  Advisory  Board  of  Education  (CABE,  1992) 
documents and the published debates of the Constituent Assembly.
Teachers, education, and politics
Two factors help to explain the dynamics of the political economy of education in India.  First, 
teachers have guaranteed representation in the upper house of the state legislature. Second, teachers in 
private ‘aided schools’ (i.e. schools that are privately managed but receive government grant-in-aid), 
although government-paid workers, are allowed to contest elections to the lower house since they are 
not  deemed  to  hold  an  ‘office  of  profit’  under  the  government.   As  a  result  there  is  substantial 
representation of teachers in both houses of parliament. In addition, the district-level chiefs of many 
prominent political parties are from the teaching community.  Even in the early 1970s Gould (1972: 
94) observed that “political penetration of the education system has gone far in Uttar Pradesh.  In this 
respect the province is probably not unique in India, but it  stands out when compared with many 
others”.  Gould also observed that  in all  democratic societies,  “continuous debate and competition 
occurs over who shall control education and for what purpose.  The question, in other words, is not 
whether politics or politicians shall influence educational processes, but how and to what degree they 
will do so.  This is the real issue in India today”.  Susanne Rudolph (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972) 
states the matter aptly as follows, “we do not assume, as is often assumed, that there is such a thing as 
an educational  system free  of  political  intervention…. In a democratic  society and in educational 
institutions which receive government funds, there will  be political influence… The real questions 
focus  on  distinguishing  what  type  of  political  pressure  and  politicisation  is  benign  and  what 
not...whether educational purposes are subsumed by the political system, or whether politics becomes 
a means for strengthening or redefining educational goals”.
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Teachers’ status in the constitutional provisions
Article 171 (3c) of the Constitution of India states that one-twelfth of the members of the State 
Legislative Council shall be elected by electorates consisting of persons who have been for at least 
three years engaged in teaching at the secondary or higher levels. The Constitution grants voting rights 
to  a  limited  number  of  groups,  including  teachers,  to  elect  Members  of  the  Legislative  Council 
(MLCs)2. These groups are Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), members of Local Bodies, 
graduates of the state and teachers in secondary schools and above.  It is noteworthy that no other civil 
servants have been given the special status enjoyed by teachers.
The  Government  of  India  Act  1919 provided  that  no  government  servant  could  become  a 
member of the legislature.  If a person held a government job, she would have to resign from being a 
MLA and  this  was  reiterated  by  the  Constitution.   Teachers  of  government  schools/colleges  are 
recognised as public servants and are bound by the code of conduct of state employees (Shikshak 
Pratinidhi, 1992). By contrast aided school teachers, despite being paid by the government, are not 
deemed to hold an ‘office of profit’ under the government since they are, de jure, employees of private 
managements.  As a result, they can contest elections to the Legislative Assembly. When this has been 
legally challenged on grounds that such teachers are paid by the government (like government school 
teachers), the Supreme Court of India has upheld the position that aided schools’ teachers do not hold 
an  office  of  profit  under  the  government  and  can  contest  elections  to  the  Legislative  Assembly 
(Navjeevan, 1988).
The ‘office of profit’ provision
This special privilege for aided school teachers has invited sharp criticism.  As Singh (Singh, 
1986) notes, “It is amazing to note that a teacher’s post has not been recognised as an office of profit. 
A teacher continues to remain a teacher in his post even after having won the election. Because of this 
facility, teachers in large number have entered into politics. It has corroded the virtue and holiness of 
the education system. Politically active teachers draw full salaries from their schools and colleges and 
they do not have time to take their classes.” The UP High Court, the Madras High Court, and even the 
Supreme Court of India, have observed that teachers working in aided educational institutions do not 
hold an office of profit  under the state government.  Therefore they cannot be held disqualified to 
contest elections for the Legislative Council and need not resign from their posts if elected as MLCs or 
MLAs.   Taking advantage of  this  guaranteed job security,  aided school  teachers not  only contest 
elections  for  MLC,  they  also  freely  contest  elections  for  local  bodies,  such  as  Nagar  Palika 
(municipalities),  Nagar  Nigam  (town  corporations)  along  with  the  elections  for  the  Legislative 
Assembly (lower house of the state legislature) and the Parliament of India.  Consequently, teachers in 
2 MLAs are Members of the Legislative Assembly which is the lower house of the Indian state legislature. MLCs 
are Members of the Legislative Council, which is the upper house of the state legislature. Teachers of primary 
schools are not included in the teacher constituency which votes for teacher MLCs. Only teachers of secondary 
schools and above can vote for teacher MLCs.
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aided schools have become politically more active and united. Furthermore, the main primary school 
teachers  association  (Prathmik  Shikshak  Sangh)  in  UP  has  been  demanding  that  primary  school 
teachers  should  be  given  the  same  privileges  that  their  counterparts  enjoy in  secondary  schools. 
Teachers in government primary schools in UP have also demanded that the same rights (as aided 
school teachers) be given to them so that they are also able to contest MLA elections (Dainik Jagaran: 
8.3.92).
Justification of teachers’ representation
The makers of the Constitution of India debated hard before they decided to make provision for 
teachers’  representation  in  the  Legislative  Councils.   They  wished  the  upper  house  to  comprise 
intellectuals and talented scholars so that society could benefit from their knowledge and wisdom. An 
examination of the published debates of the Constituent Assembly (CA) reveals that there were some 
strongly dissenting voices about allowing teachers to be elected as Legislative Council members and 
fear  expressed  about  the  potential  politicisation  of  teachers.  Dr  P.  S.  Deshmukh,  for  example, 
vehemently opposed the proposal.  He did not consider secondary teachers to be “experienced and 
sober elements”, or to be of a type “who are not likely to take part in the day to day politics and to 
fight elections and spend the money that elections need”.  He said: “We have graduates of universities. 
One can understand representation being given to them.  I do not see why a secondary school teacher 
is lucky enough also for the grant of this privilege?  I think this is very unfair to the primary school 
teachers.  Secondly, when we are considering a graduate as a qualified person to elect persons to the 
second chambers and also a secondary school teacher, how will it be possible to keep these people 
away from politics?”  Another member of the CA, K.T. Shah, remarked: “I fail to understand what 
principle  there  could  be  in  just  selecting  graduates  and  teachers  as  against  any  other  section  or 
professions in the State. The teachers, moreover, would be a part of the ‘social services’... to select a 
fraction of it like the teachers separately is again an over-doing or rather duplicating the machinery”. 
When Dr B.R. Ambedkar (chairman of the CA) rose to reply to these criticisms, he could not find any 
convincing logic to reverse the arguments raised against his proposed amendment. He could only say: 
“I do not know that those who have indulged in high flown phraseology in denouncing this particular 
article have done any service either to themselves or to the House.... We have to provide some kind of 
constitution (of the LC) and I am prepared to say that the constitution provided is as reasonable and as 
practicable as can be thought of in the present circumstances.” (GoI, 1985: p. 490). Thus, the proposal 
of  Ambedkar,  Chairman  of  the  Drafting  Committee,  was  approved  and  teachers’  representation 
guaranteed.
While teachers’ reserved representation in state parliaments was linked to their supposed high-
thinking, erudite and noble traits, a contemporary analyst observes: “Leaders of our country are found 
saying from the dais that the teacher is the nation builder because he is moulding the character of the 
new generation by his teachings.  In fact, these statements do not have any substance. They are based 
5
on slogans which do not comprehend the entire social process. Education is only part of the total 
vision of a society.  A teacher comes from groups of working persons in society who are engaged in 
different sectors of the economy, and is just one of them.  No different ideal, psychology, attitude or 
outlook can be expected of him” (translation from Raghuvansh, 1995, p. 29).
The  results  of  these  political  privileges  are  shown in  Tables  1  and  2.  Table  1  shows that 
between 1952 and 1998 the proportion of UP Legislative Council members who were teachers or ex-
teachers varied between 13% and 22%, a sizeable enough number to wield real influence.  Information 
on the occupations of contestants for the Legislative Assembly elections was not available.  Table 2 
suggests that there has been a gradual increase over time in the proportion of Legislative Assembly 
members that are teachers.
Table 1: Teachers’ representation in the UP Legislative Council
Year Total seats Teacher 
members
Ex-teacher 
members
Total 
teachers
Teachers as a 
% of total
1952 72 7 5 12 17
1954 72 7 4 11 15
1956 72 6 4 10 14
1958 108 10 4 14 13
1960 108 12 4 16 15
1962 108 16 2 18 17
1964 108 14 3 17 16
1966 108 10 4 14 13
1968 108 12 2 14 13
1970 108 14 2 16 15
1972 108 14 - 14 13
1974 108 18 1 19 18
1976 108 17 3 20 19
1978 108 14 1 15 14
1980 108 15 - 15 14
1982 108 16 2 18 17
1984 108 19 5 24 22
1986 108 13 - 13 12
1988 108 17 1 18 17
1990 108 15 1 16 15
1992 108 16 4 20 19
1994 108 15 3 18 17
1996 108 16 3 19 18
1998 108 14 0 14 13
2000 100 17 6 23 23
2002 100 16 7 23 23
2004 100 17 5 22 22
Source:  GOUP (2004 and previous years) “Vidhan Parishad ke Sadasyon ka Jeevan Parichay” [A life 
introduction to the Members of the Legislative Council], UP Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Lucknow.
Note:  From 1960, the teacher Legislative Council members were sitting in a group named the “Rashtriya Dal” 
(Nationalist Party).  This group was soon recognised by the Chairman of the Council (Chaudhari, 1983 p. 73) 
but it did not exist for long and teachers were divided into political factions within a year.
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Teachers have always been included in the Council of Ministers since 1952, except for one 
occasion in 1967 under C B Gupta’s chief ministership (in which the cabinet lasted for only 15 days). 
Moreover, several Chief Ministers in UP have been former teachers.  For instance, Sampurnanand, 
Sucheta Kripalani, Tribhuvan Narayan Singh, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Kalyan Singh and Mayawati 
were  all  former  teachers.   Many Education  Ministers  in  UP have also been former  teachers,  for 
example, Acharya Jugul Kishore, Kalicharan, Swaroop Kumari Bakshi, Rajnath Singh and Narendra 
Kumar Singh Gaur etc. Teacher ministers have also held many other portfolios apart from education.
Table 2: Teacher members in the Legislative Assembly
Legislative Assembly (LA) Total LA 
members
Teacher members % of LA members 
that were teachers
First (1952) 430 N.A. N.A.
Second (1957) 430 11 2.6
Third (1962) 430 26 6.0
Fourth (1967) 425 21 4.9
Fifth (1969) 425 27 6.4
Sixth (1974) 425 22 5.2
Seventh (1977) 425 23 5.4
Eighth (1980) 425 39 9.2
Ninth (1985) 425 30 7.1
Tenth (1989) 425 27 6.4
Eleventh (1991) 425 36 8.5
Twelfth (1993) 425 46 10.8
Thirteenth (1996-2002) 425 37 8.7
Fourteenth (2002-2007) 404 24 6.0
Sources: Table computed on the basis of information in: (i) GOUP: Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha ke Sadasyon ka 
Jeevan Parichay [A Life-Introduction of Members of the UP Legislative Assembly], published by Vidhan Sabha 
Secretariat (various issues); and (ii) Nirvachan Ayog [Election Commission] (UP): Chunav Parinam Vishleshan 
[A study of Election Results] (various issues). 
In  summary,  teachers’  privileged legal  position has  meant  their  substantial  presence in  both 
houses of the State legislature as well as in State cabinets.  This has fulfilled the apprehensions of 
some of the members of the CA who had expressed misgivings that due to their special constitutional 
status, teachers would become embroiled in politics.  The effect is likely to have been that teachers, 
especially of secondary aided schools, are more engaged in political processes that are associated with 
MLC and MLA elections than would be the case in the absence of constitutionally granted privileges. 
There is now a strong body of teachers for whom membership of the Legislative Council, or ‘serving 
their fellow teachers’ as they put it, is the ultimate aim of their career.  
The evolution of teachers’ associations
In 1921, two teacher organisations were formed in UP:
(i) Adhyapak Mandal (Teachers Board) – union of primary 
teachers
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(ii) UP Secondary Education Association – union of
secondary teachers 
In 1956, the UP Secondary Education Association adopted a new constitution and came to be 
known as the UP Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh (MSS).  The MSS is the strongest teachers’ union in the 
State.  The primary teachers association was also re-named the UP Prathmik Shikshak Sangh (PSS) 
and re-recognised by the GOUP in the 1950s.  The most  important reason for the formation of a 
teachers  union  in  the  1920s  was  the  poor  condition  of  teachers  during  the  British  period  (K.L. 
Shrimali, Ex-Vice Chancellor of Banaras Hindu University). Teacher leaders claimed that it was this 
subjugation that compelled them to unite to form unions as early as in the 1920s (Chaudhari, 1983). 
Both  these  organisations,  the  MSS and  the  PSS,  gathered  momentum over  time  and  made  their 
presence felt more significantly during the 1960s when union action became intense, mustered wide 
publicity and became influential.
Teachers  associations  at  the  university  and  college  level  in  UP  emerged  much  later.  The 
Federation of UP Universities and College Teachers’ Association (FUPUCTA) formed in 1966.  They 
also  have  much  less  strength,  publicity  and  political  influence  compared  with  unions  of  school 
teachers. In order to increase their strength and bargaining power, teacher leaders in universities have 
put  pressure on more and more lecturers to join politics by encouraging them,  first,  to become a 
member of their local union and then gradually to take a more active part in political activities and 
agitations.   For  example,  at  the  time  of  instituting a new union at  Lucknow University,  teachers 
wishing to contest for the executive of LUTA (Lucknow University Teachers’ Association) deposited 
a fee on behalf of a large number of teachers, effectively coaxing them all into joining the union.
Factions in teachers’ unions
Teachers’ unions in UP are not unified bodies of teachers.  They are ridden with internal in-
fighting and groupism.   Different  groups are  patronised by different  political  leaders  and parties, 
resulting  in  political  intervention  becoming  more  common.  The  MSS is  particularly  ridden  with 
differences  and factionalism.  Based on information provided by the  MSS office in  Lucknow,  the 
“Sharma Group” is by far the largest within the MSS. It has more than 90% of all members of the 
MSS (about 52,000 members). It has dominated teacher politics for at least the last four decades and, 
during that time, teachers’ representatives in the UP Legislative Council have been elected mainly 
from this group. Its leader, Mr. Om Prakash Sharma, has been a teacher MLC continuously for 38 
years and is the current pro-tem chairman of the UP Legislative Council.
Placed at number two in strength is the “Pandey Group” which has led many teacher agitations in 
the State.  But gradually it has lost most of its membership. The “Thakurai Group” used to occupy the 
third place.  Its strength has, however, been dwindling over the last few years since the death of its 
leader, RN Thakurai.  The fourth is the “Bhatt Group” but its presence is hardly felt and its strength 
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has waned fast. Many teachers have also assumed membership of more than one group.   We estimate 
tentatively that 80 to 90 percent of the secondary teachers in UP are unionised (A survey by Kingdon 
(1994) showed 84% in 1991).   The teacher representatives of the MSS in the UP Legislative Council 
claim that they not only represent the interests of secondary teachers but also safeguard the interests of 
all teachers of the State.   
Factionalism in teacher unions has divided the teaching community into political groups and 
ideology-based factions,  a  fact  lamented  by the Report  of  the National  Commission on Teachers, 
which considers it detrimental to the professional development of teachers. 
Teacher union strikes and other activities
The MSS has spearheaded several strikes and ‘agitations’ in support of teachers’ demands from 
the government. The following methods are frequently used by teachers to press their demands:
• Creating mass awareness through discussion, seminars, symposia etc.
• Meetings of teacher representatives with the government
• Mass casual leave, meetings and demonstrations
• Statements on mass media 
• Signature campaigns, observing ‘black day’ and ‘opposition day’ etc.
• Sit-ins, demonstrations, and processions 
• Collective fasting and gherao (picketing)
• Opposing the ministers in election
• Writing postcards to government 
• Boycott of or disturbing the sessions in the Legislature 
• Examination boycotts
• Pen-down / chalk-down strikes 
• Jail Bharo Andolan (‘fill-the-jails’ campaign).
Table  3  lists  some  of  the  more  important  union-inspired  activities,  gleaned from newspaper 
reports and from teacher unions’ magazines. However, it is notable that other than the strikes and 
activities listed in Table 3, there were substantial teacher actions in other years too.  Some were to 
oppose curbs on teacher union activities and to oppose moves to introduce local-level accountability. 
For  example  in  1979,  the  All  India  Secondary Teachers  Federation  and  the  University  Teachers 
Association held demonstration in New Delhi  on 23 April  to express their resentment against  the 
Employees Service Condition and Dispute Reconciliation Act - which gave the government powers to 
take action against teachers’ unions.  
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Under the leadership of the Teachers Federation of UP, the PSS, MSS and the UTAs organised a 
big demonstration in Lucknow on 1 May 1979. They raised slogans against the Act: “Sangathanon Par 
Rok Lagi To Khoon Bahega Sarkon Par” (if the organisations are opposed/banned, it  will  lead to 
blood-shed on the streets), demanding that the Act be revoked by the government.
In 1992,  the BJP Government  in  UP led by Kalyan  Singh (himself  a teacher)  made  several 
announcements in the field of education which were intended to improve the functioning of schools. 
However,  these  measures  were largely  disliked  by  the  teaching  community because  of  their 
decentralizing nature. The government gave more powers to management committees of private aided 
schools, self-financing schools were allowed, self-financing courses were started, pay disbursement 
authority was again transferred to private management,  cheating in examinations was declared an 
offence and security of services were reduced by giving the management of private aided schools 
more powers.  However, when all factions of the MSS united to fight these ‘anti-teacher’ measures 
and announced a call for a boycott of examinations, the government of UP declared that it had no 
intention of changing legislation regarding the  transfer  of  secondary teachers  from one district  to 
another,  or  of  bringing in rules to allow authorities to prolong indefinitely the suspension of any 
teacher. The same government also legislated the historic anti-cheating law whereby students caught 
cheating  could  be  jailed.  The  introduction  of  the  anti-cheating  law  was  accompanied  by  the 
deployment of police in all examination centres in 1992.  The effect of this measure was to drastically 
reduce the pass rate in the UP High School Exams from 57% in 1991 to less than 15% in 1992!  This 
is seen in Table 4. It is also seen that when this measure was removed in the following years, the pass 
rate crept back up.
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Table 3: Important teacher actions in UP (1956-2004)
Notes:    * led by Sharma Group;  ** led by Pandey and Thakurai Groups;  PA= Private aided school; G=Government school
Year From To Duration 
(days)
Details
1956 31 Jan. 31 Jan. 1 -
1959 3 May 8 May 2 Main demand: revision of pay scales
1964 24 Apr, 
4 Aug.
1
1
4,000 teachers demonstrated
10,000 teachers demonstrated; 11-point charter included demands for triple-benefit-scheme (simultaneous benefit of (a) Pension, (b) Provident Fund 
and (c) Gratuity, which is the lump sum amount paid at the time of retirement to employees, equal to the salary of 18 months)
1965 11 Mar. 28 Mar. 18 30,000 teachers demonstrated; demands included interim relief, equal pay to govt. (G) and private aided (PA) teachers; hunger strike by some 
teachers from 22-28 March; central govt announced financial help for UP Teachers; GOUP increased salaries of PA teachers by Rs. 20 per month.
1966 5  Dec. 10 Dec. 5 5,000 teachers demonstrated in violation of prohibitory order; demand was pay parity between G and PA teachers; teacher leaders were jailed but 
released on 17 December.
1968-6
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25 Nov. 5  Jan. 45 Initially 3000 teachers demonstrated (600 arrested); strike intensified; 20,000 teachers sent to jail; demands included pay parity between PA non-
teaching staff and G employees and direct salary to PA teachers from the state govt treasury 
1971 27 Jan. 18 Feb. 23 Total strike observed; issues were lack of implementation of agreements; 1000 teachers and their leaders arrested.
1973 3  Dec. 23 Dec. 21 11-point charter of demands included nationalisation of education; 500 teachers arrested.
1974 14 Jan. 4 Mar. >2 Pandey group threatened to go on strike; on 4 March, demonstration invited ‘lathi charge’.  Leader badly injured, remained hospitalised for 8 days. 
This was made an issue for prolonging the strike.  
1975 31 Mar. 31 Mar. >1 Demonstration in front of LA, demanding pay increases and nationalisation of education.  2000 teachers arrested.
1977-7
8
2  Dec. 13 Jan. 42 Organised by Pandey group of MSS; demands included the nationalisation of education, retention of education of Concurrent List, and parity in 
gratuity pensions etc. between PA and G teachers; 40,000 teachers took mass casual leave; 80,000 went on strike; 30,000 teachers were arrested
1979 1 May 1 May 1 Demonstrated against the Employees Service Conditions and Dispute Reconciliation Act, which sought to regulate the activities of teacher unions
1981 27 Jan.
17 Aug.
21 Oct.
7 Nov.
16 Nov.
24 Nov .
27 Nov.
1 Dec.
27 Jan.
17 Aug.
21 Oct. 
7 Nov.
16 Nov.
24 Nov.
27 Nov.
3 Dec.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
Pandey group’s sit-in or dharna and demonstration to ask for an Education Service Commission to regulate teacher appointments
‘Pen down’ strike against the removal of temporary teachers from service (in a ‘pen-down’ or ‘chalk-down’ strike, teachers come to school but do not 
teach)
‘Pen down’ strike in demand for pay revision
Mass casual leave and demonstration because of dissatisfaction with the UP Pay Commission’s recommendations
Dharna at Raj Bhavan in demand of pay revision
‘Fast until death’ (Amaran Anshan) protest; fasting teachers arrested
Pandey group and Sharma group stage separate demonstrations 
Strike in opposition to the UP Pay Commission’s recommendations
1984 12 Jan. 18 Feb. 35 Demands included nationalisation of education; 3000 teachers sent to jail; schools remained closed for 35 days
1985 30 Aug.
5 Sept.
5 Nov.
7 Nov.
30 Aug.
5 Sept.
5 Nov.
7 Nov.
1
1
1
1
-Sharma group of MSS organised mass casual leave
-Sit-in at DIOS office, ‘postcard to chief-minister’ campaign
-80,000 teachers took mass casual leave 
-40,000 teachers demonstrated; 28 demands included nationalisation of education, payment of salary for the previous strike period, abolition of 
private management in schools, and regularisation of ad-hoc teachers etc.
1986 5 Sept.
20 Sept.
14 Nov.
5 Sept.
20 Sep.
14 Nov.
1
1
1
All three groups had agitations in 1986. On 5 Sept. Scooter rally agitation against the appointment of part-time teachers
‘Chalk down’ strike, against National Policy on Education
Rally to demand the implementation of the Fourth Pay Commission’s recommendations, schools remained closed
1987* 15 Sept. 7 Oct. 23 Agitations on 16 June (warning day), 15 Sept. (historic rally of teachers with govt employees suppressed by use of tear gas and lathi-charge, one 
person died and many teachers were injured; many teachers were arrested; called off on 7 Oct.), and 13 Nov. (60,000 teachers participated in a rally). 
GOUP announced generous  improvements in Dearness Allowance (DA), i.e. in inflation proofing.
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Table 3: (continued)
Year From To Duration 
(days)
Details
1988** 14 Oct. 26 Oct. 13 GOUP failed to implement 1987 agreement; Awareness week observed from 25 Aug. Big rally organised on 15 Sept.; fasting by rotation organised from 25 
Sept. to 11 Oct.; Shouting slogans: “Jeene Layek Vetan Do” (give wages worth a living).  GOUP admitted that in giving new scales, a new burden of Rs 
656 crores would come on its shoulders.  Talks held 26 Oct. and agreement reached.
1989 19 Aug. 19 Aug. 1 All MSS factions in unified rally to demand Central pay scales for UP teachers; to make 450 more unaided schools aided; for the regularisation of ad-hoc 
teachers. Agreement pushed up GOUP education expenditure sharply.
1990 9 Aug.
29 Aug.
9 Aug. 
30 Aug.
1
2
Pandey group’s sit-in dharna in support of their 15-point charter of demands
Sit-ins at Director of Education’s offices.  Agitation programmes for Nov /Dec. postponed in view of Babri Masjid unrest
1991 5 Jan.
27 Nov.
5 Jan.
27 Nov.
1
1
Pandey group demonstrated at LA in support of 51-point charter of demands, including regularisation of ad hoc teachers, bringing more schools onto the 
aided list, and removal of pay anomalies. Thakurai group agitated in month of August
Demonstration at LA and gherao of the Director of Education offices – demanding implementation of various govt orders.
MSS underwent a further split this year – a new group (the Bhatt group) formed.
1992 10 Jan.
March
10 Jan.
March
1
‘many 
days’
10,000 teachers involved in a sit-in by the Sharma group of MSS on 10 Jan.; Many days’ teaching wasted in March due to mass casual leave, 
demonstrations and sit-ins. Unions declared (but did not carry out) a boycott of examinations.
1993 21 July
5 Sept.
16 Oct.
21 July
7 Sept.
16 Oct.
1
2
1
No statewide agitation of teachers in 1993 but most previous issues were taken up at low levels of agitation. Thakurai group satyagrah on 21 July; sit-in on 
7 Sept. and a processions and demonstrations on 5 Sept. (31 demands) and 16 Oct.  Many other demonstrations were also held during the year but they did 
not make a notable impact.
1994 25 Nov. 6-Dec. 11 Agitations took place on 5-6 May (demonstration); 25 Oct. (picket); strike 25 Nov.-6 Dec. (strike); main demands were: unaided private schools be brought 
on aid list, regularisation of ad-hoc teachers, removal of pay anomalies, no modification be attempted in the Salary Disbursement Act
1995 24 Aug.
14 Nov.
24 Aug.
14 Nov.
1
1
Sit-in at the offices of the District Inspector of Schools and at the LA, 49-point charter of demands
All four groups of the MSS came together in historic unity to demonstrate
1996 17 Jan. 23 Jan. 7 Jail-bharo andolan (Fill-the-Jails agitation). Talks with the governor ended the agitation – but MSS factions accused each other for calling off the agitation. 
Sit-in (dharna) on 6 June demanding salary payment in the first week of the month;  demonstrations on 12 Dec. at the district headquarters of all teacher 
unions in the state, with a 13-point charter of demands for district magistrates – one particular demand was the release of the report of the Fifth Pay 
Commission.
1998 1 July
8 July
7 July
6 Aug.
7
29
Non-cooperation movement by MSS which crippled the education system in the State of UP. It was the beginning of the agitation for the implementation of 
Fifth Pay Commission recommendations.
Indefinite full strike started from 8 July all over the State involving about 500,000  teachers. Government tried to suppress the agitation but the leadership 
did not bow down. Lathi charge on teachers rally on 30 July and the strike was suspended on 6 Aug. in people’s interest (Jan-hit) 
1999 22 Aug.
9 Sept.
20 Sept.
22 Aug.
9 Sept.
20 Sept.
1
1
1
Mammoth rally in Lucknow of teacher Mahasangh (all teacher unions and employees’ unions combined). Teacher leaders were arrested yet hundreds of 
thousands of teachers joined the rally, blocked the roads in the State capital and offered their arrest.
Black day was observed by closing all schools in the State and condolence meetings were held to mourn the death of teacher leader Bhagwan Bux Singh 
( who was murdered in Lucknow)
A huge torch rally (Mashal Juloos) was held in Lucknow.
2000 23 Oct. 23 Oct. 1 Mammoth rally of Mahasangh in Jyotiba Phule Nagar for implementing the Fifth Pay Commission recommendations
2004 1 April 7 April 7 Under the banner of Employees-Teacher Coordination Committee, teachers went on strike and marched to press their demands for the merger of 50 percent 
of DA in the basic pay. The agitation continued for a week. The Government had to accept their demands to be implemented later.
Table 4: Pass rates in examinations by the UP High School Examinations Board
Year Percentage of exam-takers who passed
Regular
candidates
Private
Candidates Total
1988 49.6 40.6 46.6
1989 47.6 39.4 44.8
1990 46.4 40.4 44.2
1991 61.2 52.2 57.0
1992 17.3 9.0 14.7
1997 52.4 36.4 47.9
2002 41.5 29.1 40.2
Source:  Swatantra Bharat (High School Exam Results Supplement) Wed 15th July 1992, p3
and Muzammil (2004).
The frequency of action by teachers’ unions is remarkable.  However, there is no information on 
whether  teachers  went  on  strike  more  often  than  workers  in  other  government  departments. 
Nevertheless, the Constituent Assembly had accorded teachers a uniquely privileged political position 
because it believed/hoped that teachers were a wiser and nobler group than others.    
Table 3 showed that the issues on which teachers have campaigned have almost invariably been 
to do with teachers’ pay and job security and rarely, if ever, for broader improvements in the schooling 
system or for the promotion of education in general. This conclusion agrees with the assessment in the 
Report of the National Commission on Teachers, which observed in 1986: “The main preoccupation 
of teachers’ organisations particularly since independence has been with the improvement of salary 
and service conditions of teachers. And in this they have achieved considerable success” (NCT: 1986, 
p. 73).
The other main issue on which teacher unions have lobbied government and achieved success is 
in demanding centralised government management of aided schools so that teachers can be protected 
from alleged unfair practices by their private managers and be sheltered from having to be locally 
accountable.  Arguably the biggest successes of the teacher unions in UP have been the enactment of 
the  Salary  Distribution  Act,  1971  and  the  Basic  Education  Act,  1972  –  acts  which  massively 
centralised the management of school education in UP.
The politics of educational finance
The system of financing of secondary education in UP is based to a large extent on state support 
in the form of grants-in-aid to privately managed educational institutions.  Grants to private aided 
schools account for a very substantial proportion of the education budget in UP – about 70% and 80% 
of the higher and secondary education budgets in UP respectively (Table 5) but, at present, they are 
largely devoid of performance conditions or incentives.  
Table 5: Share of grant-in-aid (GIA) expenditure in public education budgets
State Share of GIA in total 
public education 
expenditure
Share of GIA in Public Expenditure
at each level (2000-01)
1990/91 2000-01 Higher Secondary Elementary
West Bengal 51.1 81.7 44.6 94.2 84.4
Uttar Pradesh n.a. n.a. 70.3 76.7 n.a
Kerala 55.2 52.8 57.1 51.7 55.3
Maharashtra 49.4 44.7 87.2 77.8 0.1
Gujarat 35.3 33.9 64.2 88.7 0.0
Tamil Nadu 59.7 32.1 54.6 34.9 26.2
Assam 33.3 24.8 29.8 66.3 6.4
Karnataka 24.1 n.a. 65.4 n.a. n.a.
Haryana 9.9 10.0 35.8 7.8 2.0
Orissa 29.9 9.1 42.7 7.7 1.3
Andhra Pradesh 18.0 7.9 26.5 20.0 7.3
Madhya Pradesh 5.8 5.7 12.8 7.8 1.6
Rajasthan 5.9 3.2 11.1 3.7 1.5
Bihar 1.2 1.6 0.0 3.6 1.1
Himachal Pradesh 1.1 1.3 10.5 1.1 0.4
Source: Bashir (2005) who compiled it from Detailed Demand for Grants for Education of individual state 
governments.
The politics of grant-in-aid
One of the abiding demands of UP teacher unions has been for more private unaided schools to 
be brought onto the government’s ’grants-in-aid’ list.  They have achieved some success. For example, 
between 1984 and 1991, 681 junior and 298 secondary private unaided schools were made aided. 
During the financial year 1995-96 alone, 200 private, previously unaided, schools were included in the 
grants-in-aid list.  Bringing unaided schools – those run entirely on fee revenue – onto the ’aided’ list 
has a major  advantage for teachers in that  it  places them on government  salary scales,  which are 
anything between 2.5 and five times the pay they receive in unaided private schools (Kingdon, 2007).
However, it also has some drawbacks.  First, it greatly increases the financial burden on the state 
without leading to any increase in the overall number of students or teachers.   Second, teachers of a 
school that is made ‘aided’ feel indebted to their political patrons (teacher politicians/union leaders) 
and obliged to support their political activities. This can undermine academic standards.  Third, aided 
status  typically  leads  to  a  loss  of  local  accountability  as  teachers  are  now  paid  by  a  faceless 
bureaucracy far away.  Fourth, ‘aided status’ is inimical to equity because relatively well-off students 
– who previously chose a fee-paying school and were able and willing to pay for their education – are 
targeted for subsidy.   Given scarcity of government resources and the parlous state of state-funded 
primary  education,  this  seems  inequitable.  Since  it  is  mainly  middle  and  secondary  schools  that 
receive grant-in-aid, many primary age children attend private primary school first, i.e. they have to 
pass a financial hurdle to access the subsidies available in aided middle/secondary schools. Finally, 
bringing private unaided schools onto the aided list appears inimical to efficiency as well:  private 
unaided schools are more effective in helping their students to learn than aided schools (Kingdon, 
1996).  The  rapid  increase  in  demand  for  private  unaided  schooling  in  UP  suggests  that  parents 
perceive  it  to  be  of  better  quality.   This  may  be  partly  because  teachers  in  unaided  schools  are 
accountable to and closely monitored by their school managers and by fee-paying parents.  The above 
considerations suggest that while private unaided schools’ conversion to aided status is advantageous 
to unaided school teachers in terms of greatly increased salaries, it pits teachers’ interests against the 
more general interests of an efficient and equitable distribution of scarce state educational resources.
Table 6: Evidence from Indian studies on private unaided (PUA) and government school 
teachers’ average monthly salaries
School
Level
PUA pay 
as a % 
of
Kingdon’s 
study
1994
Kansal’s
study
1990
Govinda/ 
Varghese
1993
Jain’s 
study
1988
Bashir's 
study
1994
Singh/
Sridhar
2002
Murali-
dharan,
Kremer, 
2006
Lucknow 
district, 
Uttar 
Pradesh
City of
New
Delhi
5 districts, 
Madhya 
Pradesh
Baroda 
district, 
Gujarat
Many 
districts, 
Tamil 
Nadu
2 
districts, 
Uttar 
Pradesh
20 states 
of 
India
Primary/  
junior 
level
G pay 42 39 49 47 47 20 20
PA pay 43 39 66 - 50 - -
Secondary 
Level
G pay 74 76 - - - - -
PA pay 79 76 - - - - -
Source: Kingdon and Muzammil (2003) for first six columns; Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) for the 
last column.
Note: The Kingdon study sampled 182 teachers, Kansal 233 teachers, Govinda and Varghese 111 teachers, 
Bashir 419 teachers, and Singh and Sridhar 467 teachers.  The number of teachers sampled by Jain is not known. 
PUA is ‘private unaided’; PA is ‘private aided’; and G is ‘Government’ schools.
  
Teacher appointments and service benefits
Teachers’ organised lobbying for centralised government management began to yield results in 
the early 1970s when two far-reaching education Acts were passed: the Basic Education Act 1972, 
which  brought  all  local  body  schools  directly  under  State  government  control;  and  the  Salary 
Disbursement Act 1971, which brought the teachers of all private aided schools directly under the 
State  government’s  remit.  Similar  Acts  were  passed in  some  other  states,  for  instance the  Direct 
Payment Agreement in Kerala, 1972. The main effect of these Acts was to greatly improve teachers’ 
job security and to substantially centralise educational management by the State and thereby diminish 
the local accountability of teachers. The enforcement of these Acts seriously weakened the influence 
of local bodies and of private management in basic education. 
The Acts provided a basis for the many concessions won by teachers in primary and secondary 
schools in relation to appointments, emoluments, promotion and service conditions: achievements in 
terms of political lobbying.  Teachers were transferred from the sometimes exploitative control of 
private management and local bodies to the generous supervision of the State government.  The effect 
was  to  centralise  selection  and  recruitment  procedures  and  to  eradicate  the  authority  of  private 
managers  and  local  bodies  in  disciplining  errant  teachers  by dismissal  or  demotion,  thus  greatly 
reducing teachers’ potential for local-level accountability.    
Table 7: Teachers’ nominal and real salaries in UP (Rs. per month)
YEAR Principal
Inter college
Headmaster
High School
Assistant 
Teacher
Inter college
Trained 
Graduate 
Teacher
High School
CT Grade 
Teacher
CPI 
1960=
100
Nom. Real Nom. Real Nom. Real Nom. Real Nom. Real
1960-61 250 250 225 225 175 175 120 120 75 75 100
1969-70 275 153 247 137 215 119 138 77 100 56 180
1971-72 500 260 400 208 365 190 300 156 220 115 192
1973-74 550 220 450 180 400 160 300 120 250 100 250
1975-76 850 272 770 246 650 208 450 144 450 144 313
1985-86 2200 355 2000 323 1600 258 1400 226 1350 217 620
1995-96* 8000 519 7500 486 6500 422 5500 357 4500 292 1542
2006-07** 20610 797 18750 725 16290 630 14430 558 13500 522 2585
Annual % 
increase 1973 - 
1996
12.9 4.0 13.6 4.6 13.5 4.5 14.1 5.1 14.0 5.0
Annual % 
increase
1996 - 2006
10.9 4.0 8.7 3.7 8.7 3.7 9.2 4.1 10.5 5.4
Annual % 
increase 1973 - 
2006
12.2 4.0 12.0 4.3 12.0 4.3 12.5 4.8 12.8 5.1
Source: Kingdon and Muzammil (2003), and updated to 2006.
Note: The nominal amounts of pay are the minimum at the basic pay scale exclusive of ‘Dearness Allowance’. 
* Revised pay scales announced in December 2001 but applied retrospectively from 1st Jan. 1996. The UP 
government conceded these Fifth Pay Commission pay scales after 4 years of lobbying by teacher unions. **In 
December 2008, the Sixth Pay Commission’s recommendations were accepted and applied by the UP 
government without a fight with the unions. They more than double the basic pay scale of teachers from 1st 
January 2006 (as they will be applied retrospectively). 
Teacher salaries
Teacher unions’ success in improving teachers’ pay can be assessed against two yardsticks: first, 
whether teachers made real gains in salary (since that is the issue on which unions have lobbied the 
most); and second, whether they increased their share of total state education expenditure.  Table 7 
compares the rate of increase in the nominal salary of UP teachers with the rate of increase in prices, 
to see whether real salaries have changed much over time. Table 8 shows changes in the share of 
salaries in total education spending over time.
Table 7 shows the minimum at the basic pay for each teacher type in nominal terms and deflated 
by the All India Consumer Price Index (CPI)3. There was little real increase in teacher salaries until 
the  early  1970s,  although  they  were  periodically  ‘inflation  proofed’  by  way  of  a  ’Dearness 
Allowance’.   However, between 1973-74 and 1995-96, the basic salary of CT grade teachers (i.e. 
primary school teachers with a ‘Certificate of Training’) grew at a rate of 14% per annum in nominal 
terms and at 5% per annum in real terms.   Over the 22-year period 1973-4 to 1995-96, teachers’ 
salaries increased at an annual percentage rate of approximately 4% to 5% per year in real terms, an 
impressive annual rate of growth over a long period of time, given that the rate of growth of real per 
capita GDP over the same period was 3% per annum.  In the 11-year period between 1996 and 2006, 
teacher salaries grew by about 4-5% per annum, which was more in line with the growth of real per 
capita GDP over this period, of about 4%.  Moreover, it seems that in India, teacher salaries are higher 
relative to national per capita income than in many other countries.  For example, the ratio of average 
teacher salaries to per capita income (admittedly an imperfect measure of teachers’ standard of living 
vis-a-vis others)  is  2.4: 1 in Latin America and 2.6:  1 in Asia but  a much higher 3.6: 1 in India 
(Colclough and Lewin, 1993, p52 and 143).  A more recent estimate of this ratio for Asia is 2.9:1 
(UNESCO, 2006). In Uttar Pradesh it is 8.5:1 and for India as a whole 5:1 (Jain, 2008). This is before 
the Sixth Pay Commission pay scales applied, which have more than doubled teacher salaries. 
Table 8: Wage costs as a proportion of total public expenditure on education
YEAR Recurrent as a % of total 
public expenditure on 
education
Salary costs as a percentage of total 
recurrent expenditure on education (%)
Primary Junior Secondary
1960-61 74.7 87.9 85.1 72.3
1965-66 79.4 90.7 89.2 75.3
1969-70 85.0 92.3 90.4 85.6
1974-75 87.1 96.6 94.3 87.1
1981-82 94.8 96.7 93.8 89.9
1987-88 97.3 NA NA 90.7
2006-07 NA 94.7 93.3
Source: (GOI, various years) “Education in India”, Ministry of Human Resource Development, New 
Delhi,, and GOUP (various years) “Annual State Budget”.
Note: The figures published for the year 1987-88 and later for primary and junior education levels are not 
comparable with figures published in previous years because from 1987-88, non-teaching staff salaries have 
been lumped together with the item ‘other’ giving the implausibly low figures (for 87-88) of 94.0% and 91.6% 
for primary and junior education respectively. For the same reason, the latest figure (for 2006-07) is not 
comparable with numbers up to the early 1980s.  Prior to 1960-61, expenditure information in published 
documents is not presented by item of expenditure (salaries, consumables, others, etc) but rather by expenditure 
on boys’ schools and expenditure on girls’ school, etc or expenditure by source. 
3 For most practical purposes, education is a state-level subject in India (even though it is on the concurrent list). 
As such, there are inter-state variations in salary levels. The salary levels reported here refer only to Uttar 
Pradesh. 
An increase in the share of total education expenditure that goes on salaries is another indication 
of the success of teachers in winning financial victories. Table 8 shows expenditure on teacher salaries 
as a proportion of total recurrent public expenditure on education.  It demonstrates a secular long-term 
increase in the share of total (recurrent) education spent on salaries.  By 1981, fully 97% of all primary 
education  expenditure  was  going  to  teacher  salaries  and  only  3%  was  available  for  non-teacher 
expenses.  The corresponding figures for junior and secondary education were not much better: 94% 
and 90%, so that only 6% and 10% of total recurrent government expenditure on education was spent 
on non-salary school expenses. The government of India itself notes (GOI, 1985, p25): “more than 
90% of the expenditure – in some states even more than 98% – is spent on teachers’ salaries and 
administration.  Practically nothing is available to buy a blackboard and chalks, let alone charts, other 
inexpensive teaching aids or even pitchers for drinking water”4.  
Some non-UP microstudies find that the situation was worse by the early 1990s. For example 
Tilak and Bhatt (1992) find that salary costs account for 96.2% (in secondary) and 99.0% (in primary) 
of total recurrent unit costs in Haryana.  Aggarwal (1991, p86) calculates that expenditure on salaries 
accounts for 93.5% of total expenditure in G schools, 94.0% in aided schools and 87.7% in PUA 
schools in his sample of secondary schools in New Delhi.  While there is some improvement in this 
situation under the current Sarva Shiksha Abihyan (Campaign for Education for All) policy, which 
provides each school with a Teaching Learning Materials grant, these figures provide an indication of 
the success of teachers’ organisations.  
However, they also point attention to the unfortunate fact that non-salary expenditure, which has 
educational merit,  has been progressively squeezed out.  Research suggests that the size of teacher 
salaries has no significant association with student achievement but that other forms of educational 
expenditure  do.   For  example,  in  72 developing  country studies,  the  factors  that  boosted  student 
achievement most were:  instructional materials, length of the weekly instructional programme, school 
library activity and teacher  training at  tertiary level  etc.  (Fuller:  1986).   Teacher  salaries  did not 
significantly affect student achievement in the majority of the studies.  Similar findings were obtained 
in a survey of 147 developed-country studies (Hanushek: 2003).   For the state of UP, Kingdon’s 
(1996) findings were similar to those of Fuller and Hanushek – namely that teacher salaries had no 
significant impact on student achievement after controlling for student and household characteristics, 
but  that  school  resources,  instructional  time,  and  quality  of  teacher’s  education  did  significantly 
improve student learning.
Conclusions
The paper presents evidence of significant political penetration by teachers.  This is particularly 
prevalent in the case of teachers of aided secondary schools, which constitute the main bulk of all 
4 UNESCO (2006, Table 11) shows that the mean of teacher salary expenditure as a proportion of total current 
education expenditure was 92.7%, averaged across all countries on which there was data.  In the same source, 
the figure for India was 99.5%. http://www.unesco.org/education/GMR2006/full/annex2_eng.pdf
secondary schools.  It would be naïve to think that the politicisation of the main actors in the education 
sector  –  namely  teachers  –  has  been  without  effect  on  school  education  performance.   There  is 
widespread concern about the deleterious effects of teacher politics on the progress of the education 
sector in UP.   Teachers’ politicisation – in the sense of their active participation in union activities 
and the fact that such activities are directed or supported by professional teacher-politicians – has been 
linked to the poor performance of school education in India.  For example, the National Commission 
on Teachers states that “the most important factor responsible for vitiating the atmosphere in schools, 
we were told, has been the role of teacher politicians and teachers’ organisations”  (NCT: 1986, p. 68).
           In view of the negative aspects of teachers’ political activities, which are frequently 
brought into public focus in the media, they have often been advised to mend their ways and become 
constructive, through such exhortations as “teachers’ associations should play an important role in 
increasing the professional honesty and dignity of teachers and in restraining professional misconduct. 
The  National  Federation  of  Teachers  can  prepare  a  professional  code  of  conduct  for  teachers” 
(Agnihotri: 1987, p. 282).  
 The evolution of educational expenditure in UP appears to have been heavily influenced by 
the demands of teachers.  There are many indications to suggest this, including the passage of the 
Salary Disbursement Act (1971) and the Basic Education Act (1972).  The fact that these Acts  – 
arguably the most important educational legislations in UP – were passed immediately after periods of 
intense strikes by teachers, suggests that educational legislation in UP has been a reaction to protests 
rather than being based on well-conceived principles of efficiency and equity.  The content of these 
Acts has had the effect  of  increasing the job security and salaries of  aided and local-government 
school teachers. They also centralised the administration and management of schools, greatly reducing 
teacher accountability to their local managers.  This abandonment of local accountability is likely to 
have had an adverse effect on the functioning of schools.  Since the school manager or local body can 
no longer sack a shirking teacher, and has virtually no discretion to penalise errant teachers, there may 
be a greater incentive to shirk. 
The lax attitudes of some of the teachers towards their schools and students have resulted not 
only from a loss of local accountability,  but  also from the strength and influence of their unions. 
Union-backed teachers do not fear adverse repercussions if they shirk their duties. The Report of the 
National Commission on Teachers notes that “some of the Principals deposing before it (i.e. before the 
Commission) lamented that they had no powers over teachers and were not in a position to enforce 
order  and discipline.   Nor  did the  District  Inspectors  of  Schools  and other  officials  exercise  any 
authority over them as the erring teachers were often supported by powerful teachers’ associations. 
We were told that that there was no assessment of a teacher’s academic and other work and that 
teachers were virtually unaccountable to anybody” (NCT, 1986, p68). 
 Teachers’ participation in politics also has an adverse effect on the functioning of schools: it 
keeps  them away from teaching  because  they  are  engaged  in  union  or  political  activities.   The 
evidence presented here suggests that teachers are mobilised by their leaders for meetings, lobbying or 
protests in one form or another every year.  Consequently, teaching suffers.  
While no estimates are available of the number or proportion of teachers that contest elections, 
the evidence shows a high degree of participation by teachers in protest action and suggests that a 
good number of teaching hours must be lost in most years. Moreover, teacher members of Legislative 
Assemblies (MLAs) and Legislative Councils (MLCs) continue to occupy their teaching posts which 
are often not filled by replacement teachers, leading to a further loss of teaching activity, although 
only a small number of teachers are involved.  Teacher union leaders and teacher MLAs and MLCs 
continue to  draw their  teacher  salaries  (as  well  as  their  MLA/MLC salary)  for  their  full  term in 
political office, although they do not teach during this period.  
The Report of the National Commission on Teachers (NCT: 1986) – a document written with 
much sympathy for the teaching profession – levels three criticisms at teacher unions.  Firstly that 
there is too much politicisation in the teachers’ organisations; secondly, that there are too many such 
organisations and it would be good if their numbers could be reduced substantially; and thirdly, that 
teachers’ organisations have not paid enough attention to the intellectual and professional development 
of their members. 
  It  would be implausible to attribute the poor functioning of the school system only to the 
politicisation  of  teachers.    The  paucity  of  resources  and  teaching  materials;  inadequate  school 
buildings and the lack of basic facilities, must surely create a disempowering environment for teachers 
and students.  However, even as these physical facilities have improved over the recent years, it is not 
clear  whether  educational  outcomes  of  students  –  especially  learning  achievement  levels  –  have 
improved, or whether teacher effort has improved: a recent study put teacher absence rate at 25% in 
India (Kremer et. al., 2005).
While  teachers  have  lobbied  almost  exclusively for  increased  salary allocations,  there  is  no 
parents’ or children’s lobby to demand greater allocations to school non-salary expenses.  It is not 
surprising then that the National Commission on Teachers (NCT, 1986, p71) makes an impassioned 
appeal to redress this imbalance in political influence: “we must  draw attention … to the need to 
promote  actively  parents’  organisations  all  over  the  country.   At  present  there  are  hardly  any 
organisations interested in providing good education to their children.  We feel that such organisations 
are  desperately  needed  to  promote  and  safeguard  the  educational  interests  of  their  wards  and  to 
counteract  the  negative  and  unhealthy  political  preoccupations  of  some  the  teachers  and  their 
organisations”.  
Forming a trade union, including teachers’ unions, is a legitimate worker right in any democratic 
society and campaigning  for  better  salaries  and service  conditions  is  one of  their  main  purposes. 
However,  this  paper has presented evidence to show how teachers’  political  strength has made  it 
difficult for the government to deal impartially with teacher demands, and its consequences.  
It has not been possible to provide comparisons between the behaviour of teachers and other 
groups of state-paid employees.  It is possible that, by placing the activities of the teaching community 
in a wider perspective, such comparisons would suggest that teachers’ behaviour is part of the wider 
work culture within the public sector.  However, the special legal privileges of teachers place them at a 
political advantage in comparison with other public worker groups and this may have resulted in their 
having greater political influence. While such inter-group comparisons were beyond the scope of the 
present study, they should be a fruitful area of study in the future.
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